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Abstract 
Ukraine has a rapidly ageing and declining population. A	  dynamic	  forward-­‐looking	  Computable	  General	  Equilibrium	  (CGE)	  model	  with	  an	  explicitly	  modelled	  Pay-­‐As-­‐You-­‐Go	   pension	   scheme	   is	   constructed	   to	   perform	   simulations	   of	   different	  pension	  reform	  scenarios	  and	   investigate	   the	   impact	  of	  population	  ageing	  on	  a	  wide	   range	   of	   macroeconomic	   variables.	   It	   is	   shown	   that,	   changes	   in	   age	  structure	  will	  result	  in	  a	  significant	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  economy	  and	  stability	  of	   the	   pension	   system.	  Analysis of the potential changes to the pension system is 
limited to modelling an increase of the pension age, keeping either the workers’ 
contribution rate or replacement rate constant.	  	  Key	  words:	  Ukraine,	  CGE	  modelling,	  pension	  reform,	  ageing	  JEL	  codes:	  J26,	  J11,	  C68	  	  ______________________	  The	  author	  is	  grateful	  to	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  Shafer	  and	  Robert	  Wright	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  and	  constructive	  comments.	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1. Introduction 
Ukraine has a rapidly ageing and declining population. By the beginning of 2010 the 
total population had decreased by 12% since 1993, when it reached its peak of 52 
million. According to population projections, presented in this paper, the share of the 
pension age population will increase from 24% in 2005 to 38% in 2050. At the same 
time, the share of the working age population will decrease from 54% to 44%.  
Such a significant and rapid change in population age structure will likely have a 
number of macroeconomic effects. It will change the demand composition, as 
consumption preferences vary by age. It will affect national savings, as at different 
stages in their life cycles people have different savings propensities. There will be 
significant impacts on the size, composition and productivity of the labour force, and 
potentially even the speed of technological progress. 
This paper concentrates on the effect of the interaction of the declining labour force 
and the growing number of pensioners on the pension system. The topic is especially 
timely because of the revived discussion about pension reform in Ukraine. It has long 
been recognized that the current design of the pension system is subject to high 
demographic risk and its Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) component is not sustainable in 
the long run. Nevertheless, all previous attempts at reforming the system were only 
half hearted and did not address its major problems. Major reasons for that were 
political instability in the country and the reluctance of the political elite to disturb 
pensioners – a large, growing and very politically active part of the population. 
However, recently a combination of economic crises and pressure from the IMF has 
resulted in more serious and bold discussion of pension reform than ever. Currently a 
new piece of legislation, changing the rules determining pension system participation 
and eligibility, is being discussed in Parliament. The biggest change proposed is an 
increase of pension age for females by 5 years over the next 10 years from current 
level of 55 years to 60 years. The pension age for males is supposed to remain 
unchanged at 60 years.  
A dynamic applied CGE model is an ideal analytical tool for this type of problem. It 
provides deterministic numerical solution and allows for complex and realistic 
representation of the economy. Most commonly for analysis of demographic change 
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an overlapping generations (OLG) CGE models are employed. The obvious reason 
for this is a reach demographic structure of the model. The model structure presented 
by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) attracted many followers and today most of the 
OLG CGE models follow their basic approach. 
In this paper a more simple structure of an intertemporal CGE model with a 
representative household is used. The model follows the basic intertemporal structure 
of the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans growth model (Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; 
Koopmans, 1965). The standard model is modified in such a way that during the 
simulation period different age groups of the population are allowed to grow (decline) 
at a different rate. In a steady state, however, all growth rates converge to the constant 
growth rate of the total population. One	   important	   degree	   of	   freedom	   that	   this	  model	   set	   up	   lacks	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   age-­‐specific	   household	   behaviour.	   This	  problem	  could	  be	  solved	  with	  the	  OLG	  structure	  of	  the	  household.	  However,	  OLG	  models	   are	   much	   more	   difficult,	   and	   present	   another	   challenge:	   inter-­‐generational	   transfers.	   This	   question	   is	   very	   important	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Ukraine,	  where	   inter-­‐generational	   transfers	   are	   very	   significant.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  assumption	   of	   aggregate	   household	   (household	   that	   includes	   all	   generations)	  optimisation	   is	   quite	   reasonable	   for	   Ukraine,	   where	   inter-­‐generational	   ties	  within	  the	  family	  are	  much	  stronger	  than	  in	  the	  West. 
The model also includes an explicitly modelled PAYG pension scheme. The effect of 
an ageing population structure is modelled by the interaction of three processes: a 
declining labour force (which affects labour supply), an increasing proportion of 
pension age population (which affects the size of the outstanding pension benefits) 
and a declining total population (which affects the size of the government 
consumption). The modelling in this framework is a two-stage process. During the 
first stage the population projections are produced. In the second stage the growth 
rates of different population groups are used as an exogenous demographic shock in 
the CGE model. 
The model was calibrated on the basis of 2007 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
Ukraine. Simulations are extended to 100 years in order to allow time for the 
population structure to stabilise. Even though the results are reported for the full 
simulation period, closer attention is paid to the first 50 years.  
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Analysis of the potential changes to the pension system is limited to modelling an 
increase of the pension age, keeping either the workers’ contribution rate or 
replacement rate constant. The main conclusion is that pension age increase is not 
only necessary but also inevitable. Increasing	   the	   pension	   age	   for	   females	   to	   60	  years	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  macroeconomic	  variables	  and	  the	  pension	  system,	  but	  it	  is	  insufficient	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  balancing	  the	  PAYG	  pension	  scheme	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  increasing	  the	  pension	  age	  to	  65	  for	  both	  sexes	  provides	  desired	  stability	  to	  the	  system.	  
Previously the issue of the Ukrainian pension reform was studied by Dobronogov 
(1998) and Dobronogov and Mayhew (2000). They used the economic-demographic 
growth model that was developed by the Social Security Reform Project of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (MacKellar and 
Ermolaeva, 1999). The	  IIASA	  model	  does	  not	  follow	  a	  conventional	  CGE	  approach	  although	   it	   is	  also	  based	  on	  neoclassical	  assumptions.	   It	  has	  some	  features	  of	  a	  recursive	   dynamic	   CGE	   model,	   but	   it	   also	   has	   detailed	   treatment	   of	   the	   age-­‐specific	   stocks	   and	   flows	   similar	   to	   those	   of	  OLG	  models.	  However,	   this	  model	  lacks	  endogenous	  behaviour	  and	  relies	  instead	  on	  exogenous	  assumptions	  about	  age-­‐specific	   behavioural	   parameters	   (like	   labour	   force	   participation	   and	  saving/consumption	   propensities).	   Nevertheless,	   an	   obvious	   advantage	   of	   this	  model	   is	   the	   extensive	   treatment	   of	   the	   pension	   system	   and	   informal	   sector	  (defined	  as	  a	  share	  of	   labour	   income,	   from	  which	  pension	  contribution	  are	  not	  paid).	   This previous work also emphasise importance of widening the pension 
contribution base and stresses that the pension reform has no chance to succeed unless 
the pension age is increased. 
Previous CGE research in the post-Soviet countries was concentrated on international 
trade issues, more specifically, on the impact of the WTO accession. Jensen, 
Rutherford and Tarr (2004) studied the impact the WTO accession of Russia, Pavel 
and Tochitskaya (2004) of Belarus, Pavel et al. (2004) of Ukraine and Jensen and Tarr 
(2007) of Kazakhstan. The models used in these studies are static.  
The research presented in this paper expands the existing literature in a number of 
ways. It proposes an innovative application of the intertemporal CGE structure for the 
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study of population ageing. It presents a fully featured dynamic CGE model calibrated 
for transition economy. And it studies the urgent and important issues of population 
ageing and pension reform in Ukraine using the most recent data. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the 
Ukrainian pension system. Section 3 gives brief descriptions of the model, calibration 
and data. Section 4 describes simulations, scenarios and presents results. Section 5 
concludes with a discussion of the results and the policy implications. 
 
2. Overview of the Ukrainian Pension System 
2.1. Background  
The Ukrainian pension system was created on the basis of the former USSR pension 
system. It was a one level system operating mostly on the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
principle: i.e. benefits of most of current pensioners are financed by contributions of 
current workers. Pensions or parts thereof of some categories of workers are paid out 
of the state budget. In 2003, Ukraine started the process of comprehensive pension 
system reform. One of the important reasons for this reform was anticipated 
population ageing and the view that a PAYG pension scheme is subject to very high 
demographic risk. The law “On Mandatory State Pension Insurance” has introduced 
the three-tier system recommended by the World Bank (1994) and supported by 
reforms in other transition economies (Kazakhstan, Hungary – 1998, Poland – 1999, 
Latvia – 2001, Croatia, Estonia, Russia – 2002).  
The first tier is the mandatory PAYG component (the existing system repackaged), 
complemented by the mandatory funded second tier (operated by government) and 
voluntary funded third tier (privately operated). The third tier has been functioning 
since 2005, although the participation rate is very low. Introduction of the second tier 
is conditional on reforming the PAYG component and has been postponed several 
times. One of the reasons why the second tier still exists only on paper is the 
unbalanced PAYG component.  
The reform that started in 2003 stalled in the run-up to the presidential elections in 
2004, when pensions were increased sharply. After this increase, in 2005 the balance 
 6	  
of the pension scheme turned negative (for the first time), with a deficit reaching 
25%. According to the most recent data in 2010 the deficit of the pension scheme 
reached 17% of total expenditures. The main goal of the new round of pension reform 
in Ukraine, discussion of which started in 2010, is to achieve a balanced PAYG 
pension scheme.  
 
2.2. Revenue side 
The PAYG pension scheme in Ukraine has two major sources of income: workers’ 
contributions and state budget contributions. In 2010, workers’ contributions 
accounted for 72% of total revenues, state budget contributions accounted for 23% 
and the remaining 5% came from other sources. Government contributions cover the 
pensions of some categories of workers, e.g. retired military servicemen and judges. 
However, these state budget contributions do not include deficit financing, which is 
also covered from the state budget and, as was mentioned before, in 2010 amounted 
to 17% of total expenditures.  
Workers’ contributions consist of two parts. An employer pays the largest part: 33.2% 
on top of the gross wage. An employee pays 2% of their gross wage. The employee’s 
contributions are subtracted from the gross wage, while the employer’s contributions 
are calculated on top of the gross wage; i.e. total labour cost for an employer 
including pension contributions is 133.2% of the gross wage. 
 
2.3. Expenditure side 
The current old-age pension age in Ukraine is 55 years for females and 60 for males. 
The pension age was set when the pension system of the USSR was developed in the 
middle of the 20th century, and it has not been changed since then. Other former 
USSR republics, with the exception of Russia, Belarus and Tajikistan, have increased 
the pension age. The pension age in most OECD countries is 65 years. Australia, 
Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Norway, the United Kingdom and the 
United States have a normal pension age above 65 years for both sexes. Estonia, 
France, Slovak Republic and Slovenia have pension ages between 60 and 65 years for 
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both sexes and Chile, The Czech Republic, Italy, Poland and Switzerland for females 
only (OECD 2011).  
The common argument against an increase in pension age of males is very low life 
expectancy. It is true that the life expectancy at birth for males is very low: in 2005 it 
was only 62.2 years, compared with 74 for females (a difference of almost 12 years). 
However, this can be partially explained by very high mortality among working age 
males, and at the age of 60, male life expectancy in 2005 was 14.2 years, only 5.3 
years below the life expectancy of females. If an increase in pension age for males is 
somewhat controversial, then the pension age for females is clearly much too low. In 
2005, life expectancy for females at age 55 was 23.4, which is higher than the 
minimal required number of contribution years – 20 years. This means that, after 
contributing for only 20 years, a woman on average can expect to receive benefits for 
23.4 years. 
Two mechanisms of pension indexation are in place. A portion of the pension that 
does not exceed the minimum level is indexed to inflation. The total value of the 
pension is also partially indexed to wages, and this indexation should be no less than 
20% of the average wage increase in the previous year, provided that pensions were 
growing more slowly than wages. 
The replacement rate of average pension to average wage is presented in Figure 1. For 
most of the period, it fluctuated at around 33%. However, starting from 2005 when 
pensions were increase for political reasons for the first time, the replacement rate has 
increased significantly.  
Most pensioners receive pensions that are not substantially higher than the minimal 
level. Lack of differentiation is exacerbated by indexation rules, as only the part that 
does not exceed the minimal level is indexed fully. However, some categories of 
workers are entitled to privileged pensions that are regulated by special legislation 
and significantly exceed the minimal level (e.g., people’s deputies, state officials, 
judges, public prosecutors, investigators, scientists and journalists). 
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Figure 1. Replacement rate 
 
Source: State Statistical Committee of Ukraine, own calculations 
Such an arrangement creates incentives for participants to pay the minimal possible 
contributions for a minimal possible period. An illegal but widespread method of 
avoiding paying pensions contributions (and other social security payments) is to pay 
a fraction of the wage “in an envelope”, i.e. unregistered and without paying 
contributions on this amount. Because both employers and employees are not 
interested in making high contributions to the pension system, such illegal practices 
persist. As the result of this, in 2007 the effective workers’ contribution rate was 23%1, 
while the standard rate was 35.2% (33.2%+2%) of gross wage.  
 
2.4. Proposed changes The	   most	   important	   of	   the	   changes	   proposed	   in	   a	   current	   round	   of	   pension	  reform	  are	  the	  following:	  
• increase	  in	  female	  pension	  age	  from	  current	  level	  of	  55	  years	  to	  60	  years	  during	  the	  next	  10	  years	  (by	  half	  a	  year	  ever	  year)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is calculated based on the size of workers’ pension contributions, taken from the Balance of the 
PAYG pension scheme, and employees’ compensation, taken from the Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). 
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• increase in minimal required working records for males/females from 20/25 
years to 30/35 years 
• restriction of maximum pension size to 12 times the minimum pension 
• introduction of the second tier of the pension system – mandatory funded 
component – starting from the year in which PAYG system will be balanced. 
All workers younger than 35 years old will be paying contributions to 
individual accounts. The contributions will be redirected from the PAYG tier, 
starting from 2 percentage points and increasing by 1 pp every year until they 
reach 7 pp of gross wage. 
The current government aims to balance the PAYG scheme by 2015.  
 
3. Model Description and Calibration 
3.1. Model description 
The model developed for simulations is an intertemporal dynamic CGE model of a 
small open economy. There is perfect foresight and no money illusion. The model 
does not include monetary variables and all value variables are in relative prices. 
There are four agents: the household, the firm, the government and the rest of the 
world (ROW). The discounted utility of the infinitely living household is maximized 
by choosing the optimal level of consumption and investment. The description of the 
main features of the model is provided below. For the complete listing of model 
equations see Appendix. 
The household has an additive utility function, which it maximizes over the infinite 
time horizon  
U = (1+gt )
t!1
(1+ !)tt=1
"
# $ log(Ct )  
subject to the following budget constraint for each period 
 At+1 = (1+ rt )At +Yt !PtCt
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where subscript t indicates time period, Ct is the aggregate consumption, log(Ct) is the 
annual utility level, g is the rate of population growth, ρ is the rate of time preference, 
Pt is the price of Armington composite, At is the asset level, rt is the interest rate and 
Yt is household income. 
Solving consumer intertemporal optimization problem using first order conditions and 
applying transversality condition we arrive at the conventional Euler equation: 
 
There are five main sources of household income: labour income, dividends, pension 
benefits, other transfers from government and transfers from the ROW. The total 
income in each period is divided amongst income tax, consumption and household 
savings. 
The firm belongs to the household, and produces one product. The firm uses two 
primary production factors (capital and labour) in the production process. Output is 
produced by a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of capital and labour. The technology 
exhibits constant returns to scale. 
 
where XDt is the level of output, aF is efficiency parameter, Kt is the capital and α is 
the share of capital in the value of the output.  
We assume that the firm finances investments by issuing new shares. The value of the 
company is the net present value of the future dividends less the value of the new 
shares. The firm chooses the level of investment to maximize the value of the 
company 
 
subject to the capital accumulation constraint !!!! = 1− ! !! + !"#! 
PtCt
Pt!1Ct!1
=
(1+ rt )(1+ gt )
1+ !
XDt = aFKt!Lt1!!
V = 11+ rs
!
"
#
$
%
&
s=1
t
'
t=1
(
) * (DIVt +VtN )
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where DIVt are dividend payments, is the value of the new shares, INVt is the level 
of investment and δ is the depreciation rate. The value of the new shares is equal to 
the value of investment. 
The dividends are given by 
DIVt = (1! tpt )PDtXDt !PLtLt !!Pt
INVt2
Kt
 
where tp is the indirect tax rate, PD is the price of output, the last expression on the 
right hand side is the capital adjustment cost and φ is the adjustment cost parameter. 
Adjustment cost implies that the firm loses part of its production due to the 
investment process. This results in gradual adjustment of the capital stock to its 
desired level.  
By solving the producer problem with first order conditions we get the investment 
demand function, the Euler equation for the shadow price of capital (or Tobin’s q) and 
the capital accumulation equation.  
 
(1!!)"t+1 = (1+ rt )"t !
#PDtXDt
Kt
(1! tpt )!$Pt
INVt
Kt
"
#
$
%
&
'
2
 
 
where λt is a shadow price of capital 
The trade between the domestic market and the ROW is driven by the imperfect 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Based on the small country 
assumption, the country is a price taker in international trade. The final product is 
allocated between domestic sales (XDDt) and exports (Et) through a constant elasticity 
of transformation (CET) function. 
 
VtN
PtINVt
Kt
=
!t+1 !Pt
2"
Kt+1 = (1!!)Kt = INVt
XDt !!
INVt2
K = aT "T "Et
#T!1
#T + (1!"T )XDDt
#T!1
#T
#
$
%
&
'
(
#T
#T!1
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where aT is the efficiency parameter and γT is the distribution parameter and σT is the 
elasticity of transformation. 
Domestic consumption is an Armington composite (Xt) of domestically consumed 
domestic output and import (Mt) aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function: 
 
where aA is the efficiency parameter and γA is the distribution parameter and σA is the 
elasticity of substitution. 
And finally the balance of payments states that current account is equal to the capital 
account.  
The government accumulates revenues from taxes (income and indirect tax) and 
transfers from the ROW, and spends them on goods and services (government 
consumption), investment, transfers to the household and government pension 
contributions. The government balances its budget every period by adjusting the 
indirect tax rate. Both government consumption and transfers to the household grow 
at the rate of population growth. Government pension contributions constitute a 
constant share of the total pension payments. 
The PAYG component of the pension system is explicitly modelled. Pension 
revenues are financed from labour income (workers’ pension contributions) and 
government budget (government pension contributions). The two policy parameters 
of the pension system are replacement rate (relative size of average pension to 
average wage) and effective workers’ pension contribution rate. Fixing one of them 
determines the value of the other, given the number of pensioners. 
If replacement rate is fixed, the PAYG scheme is described by the following 
equations: 
 
Xt = aA !A !Mt
"A"1
"A + (1"!A) !XDDt
"A"1
"A
#
$
%
&
'
(
"A
"A"1
PFt =
PLtLt
lpopt
repr ! ppop
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where PFt is the amount of the outstanding pension benefits, GPCt and PPCt are the 
government and the workers’ pension contributions, GPCshare is the share of the 
government pension contributions, lpopt and ppopt is the size of the labour force and 
the number of pensioners respectively2, reprt is the replacement rate and pct is the 
effective workers’ pension contribution rate. 
If the effective rate of worker’s pension contributions is fixed, the PAYG scheme is 
described as follows: 
 
 
 
 
In each period, the model has to reach equilibrium in product and factor markets, 
given assumptions about exogenous variables (discussed below with scenarios). It is 
assumed that markets are perfectly competitive and there is a full employment.  
The model is calibrated on the basis of the 2007 Ukrainian Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) constructed by the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting 
(Ukraine). The calibration is based on the assumption that the initial data point is on a 
steady state growth path. In the final period of the simulation, the model has to return 
to a steady state. This is ensured by the use of terminal conditions. On a steady state, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The size of the labour force and the number of pensioners is taken from the population projections 
and is adjusted to match observed replacement rate. 
GPCt = PFt !GPCshare
PPCt = PFt !GPCt
pct =
PPCt
PLtLt
GPCt = PFt !GPCshare
PPCt = PLtLt ! pc
PFt = PPCt +GPCt
reprt =
PFt / ppopt
PLtLt / lpopt
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the economy grows at the rate of population growth, and capital stock grows at the 
rate of population growth, plus depreciation.  
 
4. Simulations, Scenarios and Results 
4.1. Simulations 
Simulations are performed as a two-step process: the first is population projections, 
the results of which are “fed” into the CGE model in the second stage. 
Population ageing is introduced in the CGE model by three growth rates obtained 
from population projections: 
• growth rate of the labour force, which together with capital stock determines 
output. Includes all people aged 20 to pension age (different in different 
simulations) and working pensioners. The number of working pensioners is 
calculated based on the assumption of constant age-specific share of working 
pensioners (2004 share) (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine); 
• growth rate of the pension age population, which together with replacement 
rate and workers’ pension contribution rate determines the size of the pension 
payments; 
• growth rate of the total population, which determines government 
consumption and transfers, and influences household consumption (through 
Euler’s equation). 
In the steady state these three growth rates are equal. However, during the transition 
period they are allowed to diverge. In the context of the representative household 
CGE model it means that this “representative household” has the same age structure 
as population as a whole. This assumption is less problematic in Ukraine where 
intergenerational links within extended household are still very strong. In this case, 
the age structure of extended household should more closely approximate that of the 
total population.  
The results of simulations are presented relative to the base run with no population 
ageing (an approach similar to the one used by Fougère et al., 2009). In the base run, 
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the total population is the same as in the simulation scenario but the age structure of 
the population is fixed, i.e. each age group declines at the same rate as the total 
population.  
Using a stable population as a benchmark is useful because it allows the isolation of 
the effect of changing age structure from the effect of population decline. In most 
cases it is equivalent to analysing the results in per capita terms. However, this 
approach is superior to per capita representation for several reasons. First, it allows 
reporting changes in variables that do not make much sense in per capita terms (e.g. 
labour supply). Second, in simulations with increase in pension age there is a 
corresponding increase in the working age population in the stable population 
scenario, which keep comparison consistent. Finally, this approach removes a 
question about technological progress, assuming that it is not age-specific and is equal 
in ageing population and stable population scenarios. 
 
4.2. Population projections 
The population projections used in these simulations are based on the assumptions of 
the Institute for Demography and Social Studies at the National Academy of Sciences 
of Ukraine (2006). The variant used in this paper is based on medium fertility and 
mortality assumptions and zero migration assumption. According to the medium 
fertility assumption total fertility rate (TFR) will gradually increase from 1.21 in 2005 
up to 1.50 in 2025 and will stay at about this level thereafter. According to the 
medium mortality assumption male life expectancy will increase from 62.2 in 2005 up 
to 71.5 in 2050 and female life expectancy will increase from 74.0 up to 79.5. Zero 
migration is close to the low migration scenario of the Institute for Demography and 
reflects recent trends. An inflow of working-age migrants would improve the 
situation. However, it is unadvisable to base long-term economic analysis on hopes 
for high immigration. It is especially difficult to project migration flows for countries 
like Ukraine, where past trends show a mixed picture and future trends will depend on 
the results of economic transition, which is still in progress. Thus, depending on 
whether one believes that Ukraine will attract migrants in the future or lose population 
as a result of emigration, the results discussed below present a lower or upper 
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boundary of potential outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the changes in selected age 
group according to presented population projections.  
Table 1. Changes in selected population groups 
Scenario  Natural change only 
Population 0-19 
2005 10689 
2050 5936 
% ∆ -44% 
   
Population 20-64 
2005 28904 
2050 18853 
% ∆ -35% 
   
Population 65+ 
2005 7507 
2050 8483 
% ∆ 13% 
   
Total population 
2005 47100 
2050 33273 
% ∆ -29% 
For the type of CGE model that is employed here it is required that in the initial and 
final periods the economy be in a steady state. This means that key economic 
variables grow at the same rate: the population growth rate and therefore per capita 
variables do not change3. A steady state is only possible if all population groups grow 
at the same rate: i.e. population age structure does not change. This was obviously not 
the case in Ukraine in 2007. Assuming this, however, is a necessary and useful 
starting point. Starting from this point, we will track changes associated with the 
“additional” population ageing that will happen after 2007. This assumption is only 
critical during the calibration stage when the level of initial capital stock and 
depreciation rate are calculated.  
To ensure that in the final period of simulations a steady state is achieved, population 
projections have to be extended until the moment when Ukraine reaches a stable 
population. This can be called the “demographic steady state”, as age structure of the 
population is constant and each population group grows at the same rate, which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 There is no productivity growth in this model. If it had been included, then, in a steady state, variables 
would grow at the rate of the population growth plus total factor productivity growth, and per capita 
variables would growth at the rate of total factor productivity growth. 
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equal to the growth rate of the total population. A population with any age structure 
will reach stable state in about a lifetime of one generation if it experiences stable 
fertility and mortality rates, and if there is no migration or if the age structure of 
migrants corresponds to the age structure of the population. To ensure that in the final 
year of simulations Ukraine will reach a stable population, population projections 
were extended for another 45 years under the assumption that, after 2050, fertility and 
mortality rates will not change and there will be no migration. Growth rates of the key 
population groups, with some smoothing in the initial and final years, are presented in 
Figure 2.  
Figure 2. Projected growth rates of population groups 2007-2100 
 
Source: own projections  
One has to keep in mind that population projections were extended for 100 years only 
for analytical reasons (requirements of the model set-up). It is impossible to say 
anything credible about what will happen with the demographic situation in Ukraine 
(like in any other country) in such a distant future. Thus, although the results will be 
reported for the whole simulation period, closer attention should be paid to the first 
part of the simulation period.  
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4.3. Baseline scenario 
The baseline scenario is essentially a status quo situation with no changes to the 
pension system arrangements. The first tier of the pension system is financed on a 
PAYG basis, except for the constant fraction of government pension contributions, 
fixed at the 2007 level (26%, obtained from the PAYG pension scheme balance). The 
replacement rate is constant at the 2007 level (35%). It shows what would happen if 
no actions were taken and the demographic situation develops according to the 
presented population projections. The results of the baseline scenario are summarized 
in Figures 3-5. All results are presented as a percentage difference with the stable 
population scenario, unless specified otherwise. 
Figure 3. Results for base line scenario (1) 
 
The first panel (Figure 3) presents four macroeconomic variables, one of which is 
exogenously given labour supply. These results show the general macroeconomic 
effect of population ageing. All variables in this panel increase in the initial periods 
owing to a more favourable population dynamic during those years, and then decline 
rapidly after 2019. By 2057 the labour supply decreases by 17% compared to the 
scenario with no population ageing. The capital stock adjusts in line with labour 
supply, but much more smoothly, because investments are subject to quadratic 
adjustment cost. It also drops lower than the labour supply because of the sort-run 
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interest rate fluctuation during the simulation period that influences the level of 
investment. By 2057 it decreases by 28% relative to stable population scenario.  
GDP per capita by 2057 declines by 22% – the value in between the labour force and 
capital stock decline. The level of import, export and foreign savings (not presented 
on the chart) change in exactly the same way as GDP. Consumption does not follow 
the path of GDP, because according to Euler equation it depends on the rate of 
population growth and short-run interest rates. By 2057 it decreases by 24% 
compared with the situation with no change in population age structure. 
The situation with government finances is presented on the second panel of the graphs 
(Figure 4). Government spending is equal to government revenues in each period. The 
indirect tax rate adjusts to keep the government budget balanced. Government 
spending grows primarily due to growing pension contributions because government 
contributes a fixed share of the total pension contributions. The second, much smaller, 
reason for government spending increase is that government consumption changes 
proportionally to total population change, which decreases more slowly than the 
labour force. To keep up with growing government spending, the indirect tax rate 
increases from 13% in the first period to 23% in 2057, levelling off later at 21%.  
Figure 4. Results for base line scenario (2) 
 
Figure 5 presents the third panel of results of the baseline simulation. In this group of 
charts, the exogenous variable is the aggregated level of pension benefits. It depends 
on two variables: the number of pensioners and workers’ pension contribution rate. 
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Figure 5. Results for base line scenario (3) 
 
As the population ages, the total amount of pension payments increases compared 
with the stable population scenario, exceeding it by 23% at it’s peak in 2045. At the 
end of the simulation period, they reach a new long-run level. Although, owing to the 
changes in age structure of the population, it is 12% above the stable population level.  
In the baseline scenario, 74% of pension payments are financed on a PAYG basis. 
The remaining 26% are financed by government. To finance benefits paid out to a 
proportionately increasing number of pensioners, workers have to contribute a 
growing proportion of their labour income. The effective rate of workers’ pension 
contributions increases from 23% of the gross wage at the beginning, to 39% at the 
end of simulation period, peaking at 44% in 20544.  
The baseline scenario shows that population ageing may lead to a significant decline 
in GDP and consumption per capita, higher taxes and an increase in the pension 
system burden on the economy.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Please note that here the same convention of expressing the level of pension contributions is followed 
as the one currently used in Ukraine, i.e. 2% of gross wage are contributed by workers and are 
subtracted from the gross wage and the rest is paid by the employer and added on top of the gross 
wage.  
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4.4. Modelling the pension system 
Three variables determine the size of the contributions and the size of the benefits in 
the PAYG pension scheme: workers’ pension contribution rate, replacement rate and 
pension age. Fixing any two of these determines the size of the third one. In the 
following sections, the simulation results for different pension system scenarios are 
presented. 
 
No change in pension age 
If pension age is not increased, there are two options for keeping the pension scheme 
balanced without an increase in the share of government contributions: increase 
workers’ pension contributions (baseline scenario) or decrease the replacement rate. 
Figure 6 summarizes these two options. In the former case, the effective rate of 
workers’ pension contributions would have to be increased from 23% to 44% by 
2050. In the latter case, the replacement rate would have to decrease from 35% to 
18% by the same period. 
Figure 6. Scenarios with no change in pension age 
 
From the perspective of political economy, both of these options are infeasible. These 
hypothetical scenarios are presented here to illustrate the extent of the problem. It is 
obvious that an increase in pension age is not only necessary but also inevitable. 
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Increase in pension age 
Two types of scenarios of increase in pension age are modelled: 
• Increase of pension age for females to 60 (as envisaged in current pension 
reform); 
• Increase of pension age for males and females to 65. 
In each case, the pension age increase starts in 2011. In each case, pension age is 
increased gradually by half a year each year: i.e. for the first scenario, it takes 10 
years for the female pension age to increase from 55 to 60 years. In the second 
scenario, pension age for males starts to increase after pension age for females 
reaches 60 years, i.e. in 2021.  
Figure 7. Scenarios w/ increase in pension age (fixed replacement rate) 
 
The results of these scenarios together with the baseline are presented in Figure 7. In 
all of these simulations, the replacement rate is held constant. An increase of pension 
age for females to 60 years has only a small positive effect on the pension system, and 
macroeconomic variables.  
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A gradual increase of pension age to 65 years for both sexes has a greater positive 
impact. GDP per capita by 2057 declines by 15% compared with 22%, if the pension 
age is not changed. The indirect tax rate exceeds the initial level for only 20 years 
(and only starting from 2054). The labour income net of pension contributions per 
worker declines by 19% by 2057 compared with 28% in the baseline case. The 
effective rate of workers’ pension contributions increases to 29% at the highest point, 
and at the beginning of simulation period it can be reduced.  
Figure 8. Scenarios w/ increase in pension age (fixed contribution rate) 
 
The results for the same three scenarios with a fixed contribution rate are presented in 
Figure 8. The dynamics of the GDP per capita is very similar with a small variation 
due to the difference in the short-term interest rates and resulting investment level. 
The indirect tax rate is lower in all three scenarios, as government spending is lower 
as a result of lower state pension contributions. The labour income net of pension 
contributions per worker declines much less: by 10% at the lowest point, if the 
pension age is not changed, or by 8% if the pension age is increased to 65 years for 
both sexes. The replacement rate in the baseline scenario decreases from 35% to 18% 
by 2057. If the pension age for females is increased to 60 years it decreases to 20%, 
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and if the pension age is increased to 65 years for both sexes to 27% during the same 
period, after the initial significant increase. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The work undertaken in this paper is an attempt to model the demographic change in 
Ukraine with special focus on the pension system. The chosen intertemporal CGE 
approach proved useful for evaluating expected changes and broad quantification of 
the impact. The model developed is rather simple, but provides very important first 
results. As was mentioned earlier OLG CGE framework is superior for analysing 
these type of problems, however it is also more involved and would require much 
more resources and data. Also the size of the demographic shock is so large that the 
change in the model structure is unlikely to change the results dramatically. The 
biggest drawback of the chosen approach compared with the OLG is inability to 
differentiate between different generations of households and observe their welfare 
changes.  
According to population projections, the Ukrainian population is going to decline and 
age rapidly during the next 50 years. This will have important consequences for the 
Ukrainian macroeconomic outlook. The Ukrainian pension system, which at the 
moment is organized on the PAYG principle, will be especially vulnerable as the 
number of contributors declines and the number of beneficiaries increases. 
The simulations presented in this paper model only the first tier of the three-tier 
pension system that has to be implemented in Ukraine, according to current 
legislation. They give an insight into which measures should be taken in order to 
stabilize the existing PAYG system before the second funded tier can be introduced. 
One obvious conclusion is that the pension age has to be increased. The currently 
proposed increase in female pension age by 5 years to match that of males has a small 
positive effect on the pension system and the wider economy. According to the 
presented calculations it is enough to balance the PAYG pension scheme by 2015 
(which is the ambition of the current government) while keeping both the replacement 
rate and effective pension contributions at their 2007 level. If the replacement rate is 
kept constant, then by 2015 effective workers’ pension contributions rate can be 
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decreased from the 2007 level of 23% to 22%. Alternatively, if the effective workers’ 
pension contribution rate is kept constant then the replacement rate can increase from 
33% to 36%. However, if the actual increase in the replacement rate since 2007 – to 
47% in 2009-10 – is preserved, then according to presented simulations, the PAYG 
pension scheme will be unbalanced in 2015. Yet CGE models by their nature are less 
suitable for short-run simulations, and more attention should be paid to longer-term 
results. Here the picture is clear that increasing pension age for females to 60 years is 
not enough to sustain the balance of the PAYG pension scheme without significant 
change to current pension system parameters. By 2057 the effective workers’ 
contribution rate would have to increase to 39% or the replacement rate would have to 
decrease to 20%. 
An increase in pension age to 65 for both sexes significantly improves the stability of 
the pension system, and has a large positive impact on other macroeconomic 
parameters. It is virtually enough to keep the PAYG pension scheme with the current 
replacement and contribution rates. 
The second tier of the pension system will be financed by diverting some of the 
contributions that are currently directed to the PAYG scheme. However, the model 
shows that, if anything, the workers’ pension contribution rate has to be increased to 
keep the benefits at the current level. However, these two contradictory requirements 
can be met at the same time. At the moment contributions to the PAYG pension 
scheme are not paid from all of the labour income and a large portion of the economy 
is in the shadow. As a result, while the standard pension contributions in 2002 were 
34% of the gross wage, the effective rate, calculated from the SAM and PAYG 
pension scheme balance, was only 20%. Thus, it should be possible to decrease the 
contributions rate to the PAYG scheme for those who pay contributions at the 
moment, and compensate for it by broadening the contribution base, through a 
reduction in the size of the shadow economy and equal treatment of all labour income. 
However, this will only be possible if public trust in the pension system is restored. At 
the moment, with almost flat benefits, there is little incentive to participate in the 
system beyond minimal contributions. On top of this, the strong link between the 
level of pension benefits and the political cycle further decreases this motivation. 
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In other CEE countries, the introduction of the funded component into the pension 
system helped to restore its popularity. Plans for similar pension reform have been 
discussed in Ukraine for many years. Implementation of the reforms is essential, and 
time is of crucial importance, as the process of population ageing will accelerate in 
the future. It is important to determine a long-term strategy for a pension system with 
stable rules, and consistently implement it. The practice that exists now, with ad hoc 
decisions connected to the political cycle, make the system unstable and decrease the 
incentives for workers to participate in it. 
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Appendix 1. Algebraic Description of the Model 
List of parameters 
Exogenous parameters 
ρ  Time preference     0.05 
adjsh  Share of adjustment costs out of investment  0.01 
σT  elasticity of transformation in CET function  -6 
σA  elasticity of substitution    6 
 
Calibrated parameters  
ty  Income tax rate 
io  Leontief technical coefficients 
α  Capital value share in production function 
aF  Efficiency parameter in the production function 
δ  Depreciation rate 
φ  Adjustment cost parameter 
INVGshare Share of government investment in GDP 
GPCshare Share of government pension contributions 
aT  efficiency parameter in CET function   
γT  distribution parameter in CET function   
aA  efficiency parameter of ARMINGTON function   
γA  CES distribution parameter in ARMINGTON function  
 
Exogenous demographic variables 
gT  Total population growth rate   
popgcumT Cumulative growth of total population between T0 and T  
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tpopT  Total population size  
lpopT  Labour force size   
ppopT  Pension age population size  
 
List of variables 
rT  Interest rate 
λT  Lagrange multiplier of the firm 
LT  Labour demand 
KT  Capital stock 
INVT  Investment demand  
CT  Consumption demand 
CET  Consumption expenditures 
YT  Household income 
LST  Labour supply (exogenous) 
DIVT  Total dividends 
GDPT  Gross domestic product 
ST  Total savings 
SHT  Household savings 
SFT  Foreign savings 
FDT  Foreign debt 
TAXRT Total tax revenues 
tpT  Indirect tax rate 
CGT  Government commodity demand 
TRFT  Government transfers to household 
GREVT Government revenues 
GSPENDT Government spending 
INVGT  Government investment 
 31	  
PFT  Outstanding pension benefits 
PPCT  Workers’ pension contributions 
GPCT  Government pension contributions 
pcT  Workers’ pension contribution rate 
reprT  Replacement rate 
ERT  Exchange rate 
PLT  Wage rate 
PDT  Output Price 
PDDT  Price of domestic production delivered to domestic market 
PT  Price of composite goods (Armington) 
PET  Price of exported goods in domestic currency 
PMT  Price of imported goods in domestic currency 
PWET  Price of exported goods in US$ 
PWMT  Price of imported goods in US$ 
XDT  Domestic output 
XDDT  Domestic production delivered to domestic markets 
XT  Domestic sales Armington composite 
ET  Exports 
MT  Imports 	  
Subscripts  
T  Time period T0	   	   First	  time	  period	  
TLAST  Last time period 
ss  Steady state 
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The model 
Firm and Consumer. Intertemporal optimization  
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2*" *PDT*INVT
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Terminal conditions 
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Intra-temporal optimization and income definitions 
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ST = PT*INVT  
TTTT SF + INVG +  SH =S  
 
Government 
 io)*P*XD- PD*(XD*  tp)PF-(Y*  ty TAXR TTTTTTT +=  
TTT TRGROW+ TAXR  GREV =  
TTTTT popgcum*P*CG   P*CG 00=  
TTT popgcum*TRF   TRF 0=  
INVGshare*GDP =INVG TT  
TTTTTT INVGGPCTRFCG*P   GSPEND +++=  
TT GREV  GSPEND =  
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Pension Fund 
GPCshare*PF GPC TT =  
 TT
T
TTT
T ppop*repr*lpop
PPC-PL*L
 PF =  
 GPCT = PFT *GPCshare  
 TTT GPC-PF PPC =  
 
TT
T
T PL*L
PPC
  pc =  
or 
 GPCT = PFT *GPCshare  
 
0TTTT
pc*PL*L  PPC =  
TTT GPCPPC PF +=  
 
T
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T
T
T
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PPC-PL*L
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 repr =  
 
Foreign sector 
TTT ER*PWE PE =  
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PMT  = PWMT * ERT   
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Zero profit Armington and CET 
TTTTTT XDD*PDDM*PM  *XP +=  
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T
2
T
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